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foreign shocks, national authorities had recourse to currency devaluation and tariff escalation. Such initiatives are typically characterized as beggar-thy-neighbor policies. Individually they are seen as attempts to better a country's position at the expense of its neighbors; together, it is argued, they disrupted international economic relations and, by impeding foreign trade, destroyed one of the only remaining sources of autonomous demand.3
With notable exceptions, such as "cheap money" in Britain after 1931, fiscal expansion in Sweden, and industrial policy giving way to central control in Germany, public policy receives little credit for helping the economies of Europe find their way out of the Great Depression.4 One can conceive of various policies these nations might have pursued: devaluation, protection, monetary expansion, and fiscal stimulus. In practice, however, there was little scope for significant policy initiative within the institutional and intellectual framework inherited from the 1920s. Fiscal policy, except in Sweden, would continue to be guided by the principle of balanced budgets until the adoption of Keynesian approaches to taxation and spending.5 Even had there existed a belief in the efficacy of countercyclical fiscal policy, it might have been of little practical consequence on the national level so long as the fixed parities of the gold-exchange standard served as an external constraint. The potential of monetary initiatives, although more widely recognized and acknowledged, was equally inhibited by the gold standard constraint.
The critical decision for national economic authorities therefore concerned the stance of external policy. Not only might currency devaluation, exchange control, tariff protection, and quantitative trade restrictions have macroeconomic effects of their own, but by changing the external constraints they could open the way for initiatives on other fronts. Some have argued, however, that such policies provided a country relief from the Depression only at the expense of its neighbors, and that by eliciting retaliation they only exacerbated the global crisis. Thus, many studies of the Depression which do not dismiss the effects of policy as negligible condemn them as positively harmful.
A proper understanding of the role of external economic policy must begin with a sharp analytical distinction between protectionist measures (such as tariffs and quotas) and exchange rate management. Tariffs and devaluation are often spoken of as two sides of the same coin, both being policies designed to shift demand from foreign countries to the domestic economy. But in fact the general equilibrium implications of the two sets of policies are very different. Tariff changes inevitably create output price distortions, while a series of devaluations in many countries can leave relative output prices unchanged.6 A tariff increase in one country is likely to reduce economic welfare in other countries and provoke retaliation; and a global round of tariff escalation is likely to reduce welfare in all countries.7 The implications of exchange rate management are far more complex. One country's devaluation need not beggar the remaining countries, and a series of devaluations can easily leave all countries better off. This paper offers a new interpretation of the effects of currency depreciation in the 1930s. We will argue that depreciation was clearly beneficial for the initiating countries.8 We then establish that there is in fact no theoretical presumption that depreciation in the 1930s was a beggar-thy-neighbor policy. While there is evidence that the foreign repercussions of individual devaluations were negative-that policy had beggar-thy-neighbor effects-the finding does not support the conclusion that competitive devaluations taken by a group of countries were without benefit for the system as a whole. Although it is difficult to determine whether the devaluations which actually took place had on 6 Exchange control is effectively a combination of tariff and devaluation policy, in the sense that it both changes the relative prices of national currencies and causes distortions in output prices. (New York, 1933) . Neither set of authors, however, works with a formal macroeconomic model, as in this paper, and thus they do not attempt to describe the structural mechanisms linking exchange rates with other aggregate variables. Neither do they discuss the foreign repercussions of exchange rate changes. The conclusion that the currency depreciation in the 1930s benefited the initiating country is itself controversial, since it has recently been argued, in the spirit of the new classical macroeconomics, that the effects of depreciation were in some instances negligible. Beenstock, Capie and Griffiths, "Economic Recovery," passim. The new classical macroeconomics insists that purely monetary changes, such as changes in the price of gold, can have no real effects since other nominal values will adjust proportionately to the monetary change. We argue that the experience of the 1930s is clearly inconsistent with this doctrine. balance an expansionary or contractionary impact on the world economy, there is little doubt that similar policies, had they been adopted even more widely and coordinated internationally, would have hastened economic recovery from the Great Depression.
I. CURRENCY DEPRECIATION IN THE 1930S
Table I sets out the basic chronology of departures from the gold standard in the ten European countries whose macroeconomic experience is considered here.
Britain's departure from the gold standard in 1931 is often taken to signal the beginning of the "devaluation cycle" of the 1930s.9 It is important to recognize therefore that the start of the cycle preceded Britain's departure from gold by nearly two years. Argentina and Uruguay suspended gold payments in December 1929, while Hungary, Paraguay, and Brazil found themselves unable to maintain their currencies at par.'0 In 1930 the exchanges of Chile, Venezuela, Peru, Australia, and New Zealand fell and remained below the gold export point. Most of these countries were both primary producers and international debtors. The reasons for their difficulties will have a familiar ring to modem observers: first, the decline in foreign lending by the United States starting in 1928; second, the fall in primary commodity prices which accelerated dramatically in 1929; and third, the 9 The phrase is from Nurkse, International Currency Experience. We elaborate on its meaning below.
' 13 South Africa's decision must be understood in terms of its unusually strong external position and exceptional attachment to a stable gold price, attributable to its position as a gold producer.
14 By December 1931, when sterling reached a trough, it had depreciated by 40 percent relative to the currencies which remained on gold. This raises the question of how countries which did not engage in depreciation could ignore such a large relative price effect. The answer is that they concluded almost universally that the costs of a loss of competitiveness were more than outweighed by the benefits of avoiding the inflation that devaluation might provoke. countries, as the burden of deflation mounted, working-class resistance grew, and devaluation was increasingly discussed.'8 By the second quarter of 1936 the external situation in the Gold Bloc countries had reached a crisis. Poland in April 1936 imposed exchange control for the first time. France, Holland, and Switzerland resisted exchange control, and suffered heavy gold losses. In France, the Popular Front, which came to power in April 1936, committed itself to a vigorous reflationary policy and to defense of the gold standard. Within months of its accession, the incompatibility of the two goals was recognized. Currency depreciation was postponed to September, with considerable difficulty, while the French negotiated with the British and Americans to prevent competitive depreciations.'9 But once the franc was allowed to begin its descent the other Gold Bloc currencies followed without delay. Devaluation had come full circle.
II. FORMS OF CURRENCY DEPRECIATION
Currency depreciation in the 1930s took a number of forms, with differing implications for domestic and foreign economies. The precise character of the devaluations hinged on the domestic and international financial policies that accompanied the change, including the allocation of profits on revalued central bank reserves, the restrictions on dealings in foreign exchange, and the mechanisms to control fluctuations in the exchange rate.
Not all countries wrote up the book value of foreign reserves to reflect the higher domestic-currency price at which gold would now be traded. The United Kingdom and many members of the Sterling Area, for example, continued to value gold reserves at par. Revaluation profits were put to various uses. One option was to use them to support an expansion in the money supply, without reducing the proportionate backing of the currency by international reserves. Revaluation profits were transferred directly to the fiscal authorities (the method used in Argentina, Italy, and to a limited extent in Romania), or else were allocated to special funds designated for purchases of government securities (the method used in Belgium starting in April 1935 and in France starting in July 1937). The alternative of using revaluation profits to extinguish government debt held by the central bank-adopted wholly or in part by France in October 1936, Czechoslovakia, Romania, and Japan-had no direct effect on the money supply.20
Another alternative was to allocate the revaluation profits to newly established exchange stabilization funds, as was done in the United States, Belgium, Switzerland, and France in 1936. In these cases, the profits on revalued gold reserves were reflected neither in the book value of the central bank's reserves nor in its reserve ratio. But to the extent that a fund was entitled to use the currency it got to purchase securities held by the public, through the intervention of the fund the revaluation profits might ultimately support an expansion in the money supply.
The ostensible purpose of these funds was to smooth short-term fluctuations in the exchange rate. The other way in which exchange rates were regulated following devaluation was through the imposition of exchange control. In many cases exchange control had first been adopted during the 1931 financial crisis as a way of stemming capital flight. In nearly every instance the restrictions adopted then were retained after the immediate convertibility crisis subsided (for details, see Table 1 The effects of depreciation depend on its form, and in particular on the accompanying monetary measures. In "sterilized devaluation" the depreciating country expands the domestic component of its money supply sufficiently to leave gold reserves unchanged. In "unsterilized devaluation" the depreciating country adjusts domestic credit only enough to keep unchanged the ratio of gold backing to money in circulation. Gold reserves may rise or fall. Two other cases useful for analyzing competitive depreciation are simultaneous unsterilized devaluation, when both countries leave the ratio of gold backing unchanged but allow the total base to fall; and simultaneous devaluation in which both countries leave their monetary base, and money supply, unchanged. Following the notation in Table 2 , sterilized devaluation is when dg < 0 but gold backing is adjusted to permit reserves to remain unchanged (dr = 0). Unsterilized devaluation is when dg < 0 and the gold backing remains unchanged (dip = 0). The effects of depreciation are summarized in Table 2 . In all cases of unilateral devaluation, currency depreciation increases output and employment in the devaluing country. By raising the price of imports relative to domestic goods, depreciation switches expenditure toward domestic goods. The increased pressure of demand will tend to drive up domestic commodity prices, moderating the stimulus to aggregate demand and (by reducing real wages) stimulating aggregate supply, until the domestic commodity market clears. The same effect switches demand, of course, away from foreign goods, exerting deflationary pressure on the foreign economy. But the extent of the change in domestic production and the beggar-thy-neighbor outcome depend not only on adjustments in commodity markets; they depend also on conditions in asset markets. Devaluation, if accompanied by sufficient monetary expansion to cause gold to flow abroad, will tend to reduce world interest rates and thereby stimulate demand in both countries. The stimulus from lower interest rates can exceed or fall short of the contractionary shift of demand away from foreign goods and towards the devaluing country. Thus foreign output may rise or fall after the devaluation. Necessary though not sufficient conditions for foreign output to increase are that the foreign country gain gold reserves after devaluation in the home country, or that the foreign country allow its own ratio of gold backing to decline.
The change in foreign output and employment depends, therefore, on the home-country measures that accompany depreciation. For example, the devaluing country could expand the domestic credit component of its monetary base sufficiently to prevent any international movement of reserves, the case of sterilized devaluation. Output rises at home and falls abroad, while world interest rates decline. Alternatively, the devaluing country might refuse to initiate any change in domestic credit. Since the volume of gold remains linked to the quantity of money at the initial ratio, the impact on the foreign country will be more contractionary than with sterilized devaluation. Domestic output rises, foreign output falls and, in the case of symmetrical countries, world interest rates are unchanged.
A third possibility is that the devaluing country recognizes the existence of capital gains on its gold reserves and expands the monetary base by the percentage devaluation, leaving the gold backing of the base unchanged (with gold valued at the new parity).26 This is the case of unsterilized devolution. The gold reserves of the devaluing country can either rise or fall. The decline in world interest rates may swamp the expenditure-switching effect, causing foreign output to rise. This analysis is premised on a framework in which monetary variables are non-neutral. One may ask whether this is an appropriate premise. There is a clear negative relationship between the height of the exchange rate and the extent of recovery from the Depression. The countries of the Gold Bloc, represented here by France, the Netherlands, and Belgium, had by 1935 failed to recover to 1929 levels of industrial production. Countries which devalued at an early date (the United Kingdom, Denmark, and the Scandinavian countries) grew much more rapidly; and there appears to be a positive relationship between the magnitude of depreciation and the rate of growth. Germany different implications for the characteristics of both the downturn and the recovery. We did no experimentation with different samples of countries but intend to increase the size of the sample in future work. and Belgium are outliers, Belgium presumably because she devalued only at the end of the period, leaving relatively little time for exchange rate changes to influence growth, and Germany presumably because of the influence of capital controls whose effects were analogous to an explicit depreciation.29 The first regression in Table 3 shows the reduced-form relationship between changes in industrial production and the exchange rate. As explained above, the United States was excluded from the sample on Table 3 . Moreover, if the distinguishing characteristics of the Depression in the United States had their greatest impact on the depth of the initial decline rather than on the effects of subsequent exchange-rate changes, then the relationship should be stronger when growth between 1932 and 1935 is compared with the extent of depreciation. Since the German economy becomes tightly regulated after 1931, it is necessary to add a dummy variable for Germany. The regression appears in the third line of Table 3 .
It can be objected that both the exchange rate and industrial production are endogenous variables, so that we should not attribute variations in economic growth to movements in exchange rates rather than vice versa. We prefer our interpretation for several reasons. First is a matter of timing. In all cases, devaluation preceded the beginning of recovery, judged on the basis of annual data. Second is a matter of logic. It is hard to make a case for reverse causation, that faster growing countries were Table  3 show the relationship between the change in the exchange rate and the change in the real wage, suggesting that depreciation, by putting upward pressure on prices, contributed to the reduction in the real wage which stimulated supply in devaluing countries. Of course, other factors in addition to exchange-rate policy influenced the evolution of real wages. These other factors appear to have played relatively large roles in Germany, Italy, Finland, and France. In Italy and especially in Germany the labor market came under increasingly strict government regulation as the 1930s progressed; it is not surprising that the change in real wages only moderately reflects the market forces considered. Figure 4 , where they are plotted against the change in export volume. The fifth regression in Table 3 documents the statistical relationship: countries which depreciated succeeded in promoting the recovery of export volume compared with countries that remained on gold.34 The result may or may not be consistent with the beggar-thy-neighbor characterization of exchange-rate policy, but it indicates that a single depreciation, taken in isolation, did increase demand in the depreciating country. In Figure 4 , France and Finland are the noticeable outliers, presumably reflecting the impact of the same supply-side factors causing these countries to be outliers (in Figure 3) in terms of wage performance.
The impact of depreciations on demand is apparent in
A second major channel through which depreciations could have influenced demand is through the world level of interest rates. Countries that devalued could have taken advantage of the relaxation of goldstandard constraints and engineered a reduction in interest rates through the adoption of accommodative money and credit policies. In the formal model, depreciation and accompanying monetary initiatives affect only the overall level of world interest rates. In a more general model, depreciation might give rise to interest-rate differentials among countries, creating not only the expenditure-increasing effect but also an expenditure-switching effect. In practice it is difficult to marshall evidence concerning the impact of exchange-rate policy on interest rates. Interest rate on assets with even approximately comparable maturities and risk characteristics are available for only a subset of European countries. In the sixth line of Table 3 we therefore report a regression of the change in the exchange rate against the change in the central bank discount rate. The discount rate is an administered price rather than a direct measure of market conditions. Yet in market economies the discount rate could not diverge markedly from freely determined rates, since central banks which discounted the eligible paper of the private sector could not afford to do so at rates far out of line from market levels. The regression indicates a positive relationship between the height of the exchange rate and the discount rate once account is taken of the extent of capital controls in Germany.35 When currencies were devalued, central banks were able to capitalize on the increased strength of the external position by reducing interest rates.
A third major channel through which exchange-rate changes could have stimulated demand was by promoting domestic investment. In-3 The same picture would emerge were we to construct measures of the real exchange rate and plot them against export volume, since each country's real exchange rate is dominated by the movement of its nominal exchange rate. " The relationship is strengthened when a further dummy variable is added for Italy, the other country with stringent capital and exchange market controls. creased competitiveness, by raising current sales, could have enhanced profitability and provided an incentive to invest. To the extent that central banks were able to utilize the leeway provided by depreciation to reduce the level of interest rates, the present value of expected future profits also would have been raised, further increasing perceived profitability, while the reduction in interest rates at the same time lowered the cost of investment. Adequate data on the volume of domestic investment is available only for a few European countries. We therefore examine the behavior not of investment itself but of a measure of the incentive to invest: Tobin's q. In theory, q-the ratio of security prices to output prices-incapsulates all the information relevant to the investment decision.36 Figure 5 plots the change in the exchange rate along with the change in the ratio of security prices to wholesale prices. Again, a negative relationship is evident: countries which depreciated their currencies in the 1930s succeeded in raising Tobin's q and increasing the incentive to invest. The result is consistent with the view that both domestic investment demand and foreign export demand promoted their economic recovery.
IV. INTERNATIONAL REPERCUSSIONS OF DEPRECIATION
Together this evidence on the structural relationships linking exchange rates to economic recovery suggests that the cross-section pattern depicted in Figure 1 is not a spurious correlation. Exchange-rate policy promoted growth not through one but through each one of the major channels: by reducing real wages, enhancing competitiveness, promoting exports, and permitting a reduction of interest rates. Whether the gain to devaluing countries had as its counterpart a loss to those which remained on gold-in other words, whether this policy was beggar-thy-neighbor-depends on the precise form of the devaluations. If the devaluing country increases its money supply sufficiently to induce an outflow of gold, the stimulus to demand of lower interest rates abroad may be sufficient to expand the foreign economy. As mentioned earlier, gold outflow is a necessary but not sufficient condition for the foreign expansion. Thus, the direction of gold flows provides an indicator of whether devaluation was necessarily beggar-thy-neighbor. The final equation in Table 3 , therefore, regresses the exchange rate against the change in gold reserves. The negative relationship is apparent: depreciating countries gained rather than lost gold reserves. Further evidence to this effect appears in Table 4 . Currency depreciation, beneficial from the individual country's point of view, was in fact beggar-thy-neighbor. Whether the gain to the devaluing countries outweighed the loss to their neighbors is an extremely difficult question. It remains true, however, that had such policies been adopted even more widely and in a coordinated fashion, they could have been beneficial for all the countries involved. In our model, a simultaneous devaluation taken by all countries may have no immediate effects; simply raising the domesticcurrency price of gold in each country affects none of the equilibrium conditions in goods or asset markets.37 But if money supplies are expanded to reflect the capital gains on gold reserves (thus holding the gold cover ratio constant), then the reduction in interest rates stimulates activity both at home and abroad.
The cogent criticism of exchange-rate depreciation in the 1930s, therefore, is not that it was used unfairly but that the policy was pursued sporadically, and was avoided altogether by some major countries. Often, exchange rates were adjusted in the wake of a crisis, although this was not uniformly the case.38 Financial crises shifted from one country to another, because each time a country known to be in a delicate position devalued a new country was elevated to the position of being the next one expected to fall. Nurkse labels this sequential pattern the "devaluation cycle." The resulting uncertainty about exchange rates may have had the depressing impact on trade so emphasized by contemporaries but also may have led international investors (including central banks) to liquidate a portion of their foreign exchange holdings and replace them with gold. In our model the effects of such actions are captured by a rise in the gold cover ratio.39 The same world stock of gold can then support only a smaller money supply, raising interest rates and exerting deflationary pressure. To the extent that demands for gold were increased by the "sequential" or "successive" nature of the devaluations of the 1930s, the benefits of an "all-round" devaluation were reduced.40
Protection, like devaluation, also is capable of exerting expansionary effects at home. But the adoption of tariffs by all countries (reducing producer prices and lowering output and employment) leaves everyone worse off; coordinated devaluation both at home and abroad together with accommodative monetary measures is likely to leave everyone better off.4' Too often competitive devaluation and tariff protection have been viewed as interchangable. They are not. This much, however, is clear. We do not present a blanket endorsement of the competitive devaluations of the 1930s. Though it is indisputable that currency depreciation conferred macroeconomic benefits on the initiating country, because of accompanying policies the depreciations of the 1930s had beggar-thy-neighbor effects. Though it is likely that currency depreciation (had it been even more widely adopted) would have worked to the benefit of the world as a whole, the sporadic and uncoordinated approach taken to exchange-rate policy in the 1930s tended, other things being equal, to reduce the magnitude of the benefits.
